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may be well to consider that a promise may be one to make a will, in determining
the time when the rights of the third party beneficiary become unalterable
without his consent. This is true, not because an exception should be made, but
because such a consideration affords an opportunity to clearly see the conse-
quences of such a rule.' 0 3 Also, constructive conditions of exchange in bilateral
contracts should not be applied as a matter of course, especially when unjust
results may be reached. The fact that situations rarely arise where such conditions
should not apply, is no justification to discard the reason why they exist.
A contract to make mutual wills in favor of third party beneficiaries is un-
dependable as a device for disposition of property if the confusion that now exists
continues.' 0 4 An attempt has been made to help clarify the matter and show that a
separation agreement to make mutual wills in favor of the children constitutes a
bilateral contract in California. This contract may be rescinded by mutual consent
of the contracting parties anytime before the beneficiary institutes a suit or
changes position in reliance. The promises may or may not be dependent, depend-
ing on the circumstances of the case. An examination of California cases has been
made to avoid an ill-founded application of stare decisis to support a contrary
result.
Gerald Y. Sekiya*
103 Compare Meislin, Revocation of Contracts to Bequeath Benefitting Third Parties,
44 VA. L. R v. 41 (1958). Professor Meislin urges an exception to the "vesting" rule of
section 142 of the Restatement of Contracts when the contract involves a promise to
make a will. Perhaps this conclusion is the result of a dislike for the rule of section 142,
rather than a desire for special treatment of contracts to make wills.
104 "The contract to devise and bequeath or, as we may call it more concisely, the
contract to make a will is not among the devices favored by the bar for estate-planning
purposes. But it is widely used by laymen; it has, perhaps for that reason, figured in a
considerable amount of litigation; and it is, as pointed out by Sparks, an appropriate,
and under certain circumstances the only available tool to achieve a number of legiti-
mate ends." Eheinstein, Critique: Contracts to Make a Will, 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1224,
1225 (1955).
* Member, Second Year Class.
TAXABILITY OF TESTAMENTARY TRANSFER
MADE FOR ADEQUATE CONSIDERATION
All estate1 and inheritance2 tax statutes provide that a transfer by will from a
person who dies possessed of the property transferred, while a domiciliary of the
state, is a taxable transfer.8 This all inclusive language has caused a number of
' An estate tax is a tax on what is left by the decedent and not on what comes to
the beneficiaries or heirs. United States v. Stewart, 270 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1959).
2 "The inheritance tax is not a tax on the property of the decedent but is an excise
imposed on the privilege of succeeding to property upon the death of the owner." Estate
of Barter, 30 Cal. 2d 549, 557, 184 P.2d 305, 309 (1947).
3 E.g., CAL. REv. & TAx. CoDE § 13601; D.C. CODE ANN. § 1601 (1961); MAss.
GEN. LAws ch. 65, § 1 (1965); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54: 34-1 (1965).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [VCol. 18
state courts to consider whether a testamentary transfer, supported by adequate
and full consideration, is to be subject to a death tax. The Supreme Court of
California faced this question for the first time in Estate of Vai.4 The court held,
with Chief Justice Traynor dissenting, that to the extent a testamentary transfer
was supported by full consideration, it was not includible in deceden's gross
estate for computing the death tax. The supreme court thus overruled the decision
of the district court of appeals in Estate of Grogan.5
Prior Judicial Interpretation in California
Estate of Grogan6 was the first case in California to consider this question.
There, a husband and wife entered into a property settlement agreement which
was later incorporated into a decree of divorce. Under this agreement, the hus-
band agreed to create a testamentary trust, the income from which was to be paid
to and become the separate property of his wife during her life. At her death, the
unexpended portion of the corpus was to go to their minor child. In consideration
for this promise, the wife renounced her right to inherit from her husband.
When the husband died an inheritance tax was imposed on the trust fund
created by his will. In opposing the tax, the wife contended that the bequest
operated merely to fulfill an obligation created by the property settlement agree-
ment; and, therefore, did not constitute a transfer within the meaning of section
2 of the Inheritance Tax Act.7 The court, however, upheld the tax, saying:
The reason for such transfer is not taken into consideration. The result is all that
is considered; that is, the transfer itself.... The statute here does not provide for
a tax because someone has a right arising out of a debt or otherwise, but only
when a transfer of property is brought about by means of a will is a tax imposed.
It is a tax on the vehicle carrying the right, rather than a tax upon the right itself.
It is in effect a declaration of law that when a will is used as a means of con-
veyance of property a tax must be paid for this privilege.8
The Grogan case was somewhat restricted by Estate of Rath,9 decided four-
teen years later, There, a husband and wife entered into a written agreement
whereby the wife agreed to will her separate property to her husband in the
event he survived her. The husband agreed, in turn, to make a will devising such
portion of said property as he did not consume in his lifetime to his wife's two
nephews. The husband died five months after his wife, leaving by his will the
real estate, which was the subject of the agreement, to his wife's two nephews.
The California Supreme Court held that the property was not includible in the
husband's gross estate for computing the inheritance tax. The court expressly
distinguished Estate of Grogan,1O as well as certain New York decisions," saying:
465 A.C. 139, 52 Cal. Rptr. 705, 417 P.2d 161 (1966).
563 Cal. App. 536, 219 Pac. 87 (1923). This case is criticized in Note, 12 CAL. L.
REv. 233 (1923).
B Ibid.
7 CAL. REv. & TAx. CODE. § 13601. This section provides "A tax shall be, and is,
hereby imposed upon transfer of any property ... by will."
8 63 Cal. App. at 544, 219 Pac. at 90. (Emphasis added.)
9 10 Cal. 2d 399, 75 P.2d 509 (1937).
10 Estate of Grogan, 63 Cal. App. 536, 219 Pac. 87 (1923).
"I1n re Howell's Estate, 255 N.Y. 211, 174 N.E. 457 (1931); In re Kidd's Estate,
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Said decisions are to the effect that a transfer made by will is taxable although
in pursuance of a contract, in payment of a debt, or for services rendered. Said
decisions had reference to a situation where the testator is disposing of his own
property, not of property held by him in trust for others, as to which his will is
a mere conduit of title.' 2
By distinguishing Grogan, Rath limited the decision to allowing a deduction
where the testamentary transfer is of property held in trust by the testator. This
means that where A promises B to devise B's property to C, the testamentary
transfer from A to C is not a taxable transfer at A's death. Nevertheless, Grogan
still seemed to remain authority for the imposition of an inheritance tax at A's
death where A promises B to devise As property to C.
Grogan was further limited by Estate of Belknap.13 In Belknap, a husband
and wife entered into a property settlement agreement. In partial settlement of all
the wife's property rights in his estate, the husband agreed to direct his executor
by his will to purchase a 20,000 dollar annuity bond for his wife. The husband so
provided in his will. The court, holding that the annuity bond purchased by the
executor was not taxable, said:
The contract having been made for a valuable consideration as a complete settle-
ment of all property rights, which rights were approved and awarded by the
terms of the interlocutory decree from which no appeal was taken, it was en-
forceable regardless of the provision of the will. The transfer of interest in the
property was therefore made by the contract before the will was executed, and
the wife was entitled to exemption from inheritance taxes on the annuities.14
Estate of Vai
The Supreme Court of California had an opportunity to evaluate Belknap and
Rath when it heard Estate of Vai.15 Giovanni and Tranquilla Va had cared for
their incompetent daughter, Madeline, for twenty-seven years until January, 1953,
when marital discord ensued. After filing a separate maintenance action, Tran-
quilla entered into a property settlement agreement with Giovanni.1 6
The community assets of Giovanni and Tranquilla exceeded 1,000,000 dollars
when the property settlement agreement was executed. In consideration for
Giovanni's promise to provide for Madeline's lifetime care, and to hold Tranquilla
harmless from this obligation, he received by far the majority of the community
property. Tranquilla received only a parcel of improved real estate valued at
'150,000 dollars,lr 26,000 dollars in cash, an automobile, an assured lifetime in-
188 N.Y. 274, 80 N.E. 924 (1907); In re Gould's Estate, 156 N.Y. 423, 51 N.E. 287
(1898).
12 10 Cal. 2d at 407, 75 P.2d at 513. (Emphasis added.)
13 66 Cal. App. 2d 644, 152 P.2d 657 (1944).
14 Id. at 657, 152 P.2d 664.
1565 A.C. 139, 52 Cal. Rptr. 705, 417 P.2d 161 (1966).
16 Following the execution of the property settlement agreement, the separate main-
tenance action was abandoned. Therefore, the agreement could not have been incorpo-
rated into a court decree as in Belknap.
17 Although not directly related to the scope of this article, a very interesting prob-
lem is raised by the decision of the United States Supreme Court in United
States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1966) as to whether a federal income tax is due upon the
transfer of improved real estate. In Davis the Court approved an income tax on a transfer
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come of 6,000 dollars per year after taxes and freedom from the community
obligations.' 8
The property settlement agreement provided that Giovanni was to support
and maintain Madeline during his life; and, that he would create a testamentary
trust to provide for her lifetime support.' 9 By his will, Giovanni left substantially
his entire estate in trust; the income directed to be distributed to Madeline during
her life.
Giovanni's executors estimated the cost of supporting Madeline at 2,500 dollars
per month. Capitalized by Madeline's life expectancy, this represented 515,341.56
dollars as of the date of Giovanni's death. The executors claimed that this amount
should be treated as a non-taxable transfer.
The court rejected the Grogan test of looking only to the transfer itself and
not to the reasons behind it. The majority adopted the modem view that in deter-
mining whether a transfer is subject to an inheritance tax, the realities of sub-
stance should control the niceties of form.20 The court looked beyond the vehicle
used to carry out the transfer, and examined the motives for it. To the extent
that the transfer was supported by adequate and full consideration, the majority
concluded it was simply a means of fulfilling the testator's contractual obligation.
Suppose the testator had not provided for Madeline in his will, but, instead
of appreciated property by a husband to his wife pursuant to a property settlement
agreement. Under the law of Delaware, where the husband and wife were domiciled,
the husband is deemed to own all the "community" property subject to his wife's right
upon divorce to a reasonable share. In dividing their property, the husband transferred
certain shares of stock to his wife. The court held that the difference between the fair
market value of the shares and the original cost to the husband was subject to taxation
as a capital gain. Under § 61(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, an income tax
is due on "gains derived from dealings in property." The court held that this section was
designed to tax the economic growth of the shares.
In California, a wife has a vested one-half interest in all community property; there-
fore, when the husband conveys to her the fee simple in certain real estate in exchange
for his freedom from his legal obligations, a sale is transacted. An economic benefit inures
to the husband, and seemingly this benefit is subject to taxation under § 61(a). For an
excellent discussion of the Davis case and its impact in community property states, see
Note, 10 U.C.L.A.L. RPv. 425 (1963).
'8 After Giovanni's death, Tranquilla brought an action to rescind the property
settlement agreement on the ground that Giovanni had fraudulently concealed part of
the community assets at the time the agreement was made. The California Supreme
Court, in Vai v. Bank of America, 56 Cal. 2d 329, 15 Cal. Rptr. 71, 364 P.2d 247 (1961),
held that Tranquilla could rescind the agreement, and that she was entitled to relief
because of the constructive fraud of Giovanni. After this decision, Tranquilla entered
into a stipulation agreement with the executors of Giovanni's estate whereby she re-
ceived $500,000 for the decedent's fraud. Under this settlement, Tranquilla waived all of
her rights under the property settlement agreement except Giovanni's promise to provide
for Madeline's lifetime support and care. Brief for Appellant, p. 15, In re Estate of Vai,
237 A.C.A. 901, 47 Cal. Rptr. 227 (1965).
'9 Brief for Appellant, p. 8, In re Estate of Va, 237 A.C.A. 901, 47 Cal. Rptr. 227
(1965).
20 See Kelly v. Woolsey, 177 Cal. 325, 170 Pac. 837 (1918); Estate of Stevens, 163
Cal. App. 2d 255, 329 P.2d 337 (1958); In re Hyde's Estate, 92 Cal. App. 2d 6, 206
P.2d 420 (1949).
NOTES
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devised all his property to others. What contractual rights would Madeline have
had? It is well established in California, as in the majority of jurisdictions, that
the daughter could have enforced the contract between her parents by an action
for quasi-specifie performance. 21 In his dissenting opinion in Vai, Chief Justice
Traynor relies on In re Kidds Estate22 for the proposition that any recovery ob-
tained by the daughter through an action for quasi-specific performance would
be subject to an inheritance tax. However, the court in Vai, by overruling Estate
of Grogan,23 impliedly disapproved of the holding in the Kidd case,24 thus re-
moving the possibility that a person would be relieved of tax consequences simply
by performing his contractual obligations. This may cause the court's decision in
Vai to have a very significant effect. To the extent a testamentary transfer is
supported by full consideration, it is not includible in the transferors gross estate
for computing the state inheritance tax. It is seemingly immaterial whether the
transfer is effected by the testator's will or by the judicial enforcement of a third
party beneficiary contract.
California Statutory Provisions
The legislature has made it quite clear that every transfer by will is subject
to an inheritance tax.2 5 Moreover, no exception has been provided for a testa-
mentary transfer, even if it is supported by an adequate and full consideration.
Therefore, the court in Vai violates the generally recognized rule that "deductions
are matters of legislative grace, and one seeking a deduction must show that he
comes clearly within the terms of the statute allowing it."26
When Giovanni Vai signed the property settlement agreement, the California
Administrative Code provided:
A transfer by will is subject to the Inheritance Tax Law even though made pur-
suant to an agreement between the transferee and the decedent for an adequate
and full consideration in money or money's worth which was received by the
21 "A contract to make a will cannot be specifically enforced because 'in the lifetime
of a party all testamentary powers are in their nature revocable and after his death it is
no longer possible for him to make a will. Courts of equity have adopted a remedy
equivalent to a specific performance by compelling those upon whom the legal title had
descended to convey to the beneficiary under the contract on the ground that they hold
as trustees for the beneficiaries. . . .' This practice has developed what is termed the
quasi-specific performance theory." Sonnicksen v. Sonnicksen, 45 Cal. App. 2d 46, 53,
113 P.2d 495, 499 (1941); 2 WILMsMTON, CoNRACrs, §§ 347, 356, 370 (3d ed. 1959).
22188 N.Y. 274, 80 N.E. 924 (1907).
23 63 Cal. App. 536, 219 Pac. 87 (1923).
24 Cited with approval in Estate of Rath, 10 Cal. 2d 399, 407, 75 P.2d 509, 513
(1937); Estate of Grogan, 63 Cal. App. 536, 539, 219 Pac. 87, 88 (1923).
2 5 CA.. REv. & TAx. CODE § 13601: "A transfer by will or the laws of succession of
the state from a person who dies seized or possessed of the property transferred while a
resident of this state is a transfer subject to this part." CA.. REzv. & TAx. CODE § 13304:
"'Transfer' includes the passage of any property, or any interest therein, or income
therefrom, in possession or enjoyment, present or future, in trust or otherwise." CAL.. R:v.
& TAx. CODE § 13401: "An inheritance tax is hereby imposed upon every transfer subject
to this part." (Emphasis added.)
2 6 Markwell's Estate v. Commissioner, 112 F.2d 253 (7th Cir. 1940); Empire Trust
Co. v. Commissioner, 94 F.2d 307, 310 (4th Cir. 1938).
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decedent. In such case, the transferee takes from the decedent under the will
and not by virtue of the agreement.27
The majority of the court quickly passed over this provision saying that it
did not "represent a correct interpretation of legislative intent."28 Giving full
effect to the clarity of the statutory provisions,29 it seems obvious that this admin-
istrative provision gives the proper interpretation to the legislature's intention.
The court does great violence to the statutory language in reaching its con-
clusion.30
Alternative Solution
The court could have reached the same result by other means doing no vio-
lence to the clear language of the statutes. The transfer to the incompetent daugh-
ter was actually from the wife and not from the husband. Under the property
settlement agreement, the wife agreed to transfer a substantial part of her share
in the community property to her husband. He agreed, in turn, to create a testa-
mentary trust to provide for their incompetent daughter's lifetime support and
maintenance. Thus, to the extent the wife renounced her share in the community
property, the trust corpus represented property held by the husband in trust for
the daughter. Following the Rath case, the court could have allowed an exemption
for a testamentary transfer of property held in trust by the testator.
A second alternative method of reaching the same conclusion would have
been to rely on section 13983 of the California Revenue and Taxation Code, which
provides: "Debts of a decedent owed by him at the time of his death are de-
ductible from the appraised value of the property included in any transfer subject
to this part made by the decedent." At the time of his death, the husband was
indebted to his daughter in a sum equal to the amount necessary for her lifetime
support and maintenance. The daughter was a creditor beneficiary under the
property settlement agreement, and possessed a valid claim against her father's
estate.8 1 The court, however, chose a more direct means of reaching its holding.
27 CAr.oRNt_- A~mnmnAm CODE, r. 18, Regs. 13601-03(a).
28 In re Estate of Vai, 65 A.C. 139, 52 Cal. Rptr. 705, 711, 417 P.2d 161, 167
(1966).29 
"Unless the contrary appears, statutory words are presumed to be used in their
ordinary and usual sense, and with a meaning commonly attributable to them." Burnet
v. Brooks, 288 U.S. 378, 391 (1933). See Estate of Letchworth, 201 Cal. 1, 255 Pac.
195 (1927).
30 The court's holding that the property passed to the daughter through the will
and not through the contract also does violence to the eleventh paragraph of Giovanni's
will: 'During the entire term of this trust the whole title, both legal and equitable, in
fee, to the trust estate is and shall be vested in the trustee (named in the will) as such
title in the trustee is necessary for its due execution of this trust, and no interest therein
is vested in any beneficiary hereunder. The interest of the beneficiary is personal only,
consisting of the right to enforce the due performance of the trust." Brief for Respondent,
p. 4, In re Estate of Vai, 237 A.C.A. 901, 47 Cal. Rptr. 227 (1965). (Emphasis added.)
aiRF sTATEmNT, Co~m as § 133(1)(b) (1932): "Where performance of a
promise in a contract will benefit a party other than the promisee, that party is ... a
creditor beneficiary if no purpose to make a gift appears from the terms of the promise
in view of the accompanying circumstances and performance of the promise will satisfy
an actual or supposed or asserted duty of the promisee to the beneficiary. . . " Ander-
son v. Calaveras Cent. Mining Corp., 13 Cal. App. 2d 338, 57 P.2d 560 (1936).
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Correctness of the Vai Decision )
The court's holding in Estate of Vai places California in a minority position.
The great majority of courts which have considered statutes almost identical to
section 13601 of the California Revenue and Taxation Code have reached deci-
sions contrary to the Vai case.32 They have held that a testamentary transfer,
otherwise subject to the inheritance tax, will not be excluded from the decedents
gross estate even if made pursuant to a contract supported by full consideration.33
The minority view, now adopted by California, is easily justified and seems
to be the answer the legislature would give were the question presented to it.
The reason for this conclusion is that the result of such testamentary transfers,
when made for full value, can in no way defeat the statutory purpose of an
inheritance tax; since the estate is not depleted in value, it is merely changed
in form.34 In exchange for the property devised, the testator has received other
property which is included in his taxable gross estate. To prevent the imposition
of an inheritance tax on the mere form of the transfer, the court should examine
the effect and operation of the property settlement agreement under the circum-
stances existing at the time the contract is executed. If such an examination dis-
closes that the decedent received full consideration in money's value, then the
transfer is merely an exchange of assets; his estate is not reduced and no tax is
avoided.
Legal Obligation of Support as Adequate Consideration
The district court's dicta in Estate of VaV5 raises the question whether a
parent's legal obligation to reasonably support an incompetent adult child is ade-
quate consideration, for taxation purposes, for the promise to support the child.
This question has not been decided in California; however, the State Controller's
office in the past has rejected all claims for deduction based on such ground.3 6
"If the duty of a parent to support his child is adequate consideration to exempt
from taxes the transfers made to such child, then there would never be any gift
or inheritance tax on the property or transfers to his dependent child."at
The federal courts, in determining whether to include property within the
decedents gross estate in computing the federal estate tax, have disapproved
of the Grogan test that form controls substance.38 Instead, they have held that
82 The following cases have held such transfers taxable: Slyder v. District of Colum-
bia, 187 F.2d 217 (D.D.C. 1951); State v. Mollier, 96 Kan. 51, 152 Pac. 771 (1915);
Clarke v. Treasurer & Receiver Gen., 226 Mass. 301, 115 N.E. 416 (1917); State ex rel.
March v. Probate Court, 168 Minn. 508, 210 N.W. 389 (1928); Carter v. Craig, 77
N.H. 200, 90 At. 598 (1914); In re Gould's Estate, 156 N.Y. 423, 51 N.E. 287 (1898);
Sheppard v. Desmond, 169 S.W.2d 788 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943). Contra: Schroeder v.
Zink, 4 N.J. 1, 5, 71 A.2d 321, 325 (1950).
33 Cases cited note 32 supra.
84 Schroeder v. Zink, 4 N.J. 1, 5, 71 A.2d 321, 325 (1950).
85237 A.C.A. 901, 911, 47 Cal. Rptr. 227, 233 (1965).
36 Interview on September 23, 1966 with Mr. Milton D. Harris, head of the San
Francisco office of the Inheritance and Gift Tax Division of the State Controller's office.
7 Brief for Respondent, p. 14, In re Estate of Vai, 65 A.C, 139, 52 Cal. Rptr. 705,
417 P.2d 161 (1966).
38 See Chase Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 225 F.2d 621 (8th Cir. 1955); Helvering
v. United States Trust Co., 111 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1940).
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where a parent fulfills his legal obligation to provide for his child's reasonable
support, the amounts so paid (or put into a trust for that purpose) are exempt
from the federal estate tax because the transfer is supported by full and adequate
consideration. 39 This is based on the sound reasoning that the parent is fulfilling
an obligation that would otherwise be imposed upon the government. This reason-
ing has been restricted to those situations in which the state has imposed a legal
duty on the taxpayer. The same view should be adopted by the California courts,
since our statutes provide that a parent has the legal duty to reasonably support
a minor and a mentally incompetent child. This statutory duty is designed to
fulfill an obligation that would otherwise fall upon the state. The federal courts
have recognized the fulfillment of this obligation to be exempt from taxation, and
so should the California courts when the question is presented to them.
Tax Consequences
Gift Tax
The decision in Estate of Vai raises the question whether a gift tax can be
successfully imposed on the transfer to the daughter. By holding that the testa-
mentary transfer was supported by full consideration to the extent that the wife's
renounced share of the community property was of equal value to the trust corpus,
the Supreme Court precluded the imposition of a gift tax upon the decedent.
However, as discussed above, it is arguable that the real transfer was from the
wife to the daughter. If this can be successfully established, and a gift tax is
imposed on the transfer, can the wife obtain a tax deduction to the extent that
the trust fulfills her legal duty to support the incompetent daughter?40 The Cali-
fornia gift tax law does not expressly cover this problem. Moreover, the California
Revenue and Taxation Code sections that are nearest in point lack judicial con-
struction and application.
California Revenue and Taxation Code, section 15106 provides:
Where property is transferred for less than an adequate and full consideration in
money or money's worth, the amount by which the value of the property exceeds
the value of the consideration is a gift.
A similar provision is found in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.43 In applying
the federal provision, the federal courts have held that the discharge by a parent
of his legal obligation to provide for the support of his child is deemed adequate
and full consideration in money's worth.42 By fulfilling his obligation, the parent
is saving the state and federal governments the expense of providing such support.
For this reason, the California courts should follow the federal courts, holding
such transfers to be nontaxable.
California Revenue and Taxation Code section 15105 apparently provides that
support transfers are not subject to the gift tax. This may be implied from the
39 ibid.40 In an interview on November 15, 1966 with Mr. Milton D. Harris, supra note 39,
he stated that his office is presently bringing a claim against Mrs. Tranquilla Vai for a
gift tax on her transfer to the incompetent daughter.41 Lr. Rsv. CODE of 1954, § 2512(b).
42 INT. Rsv. CODE of 1954, § 2512(b); Hooker v. Commissioner, 174 F.2d 863 (5th
Cir. 1949); McDonald Trust, 19 T.C. 672 (1953).
NOTES
section's definition of a "donor" as an "individual who transfers property to
another with a donative intent." Although the desire to benefit one's child is a
definite motive behind most of the support transfers, such motive is not necessarily
illustrative of a donative intent. Rather, it shows the transferors interest in ful-
filling his legal obligation of support. In the Vai case, for example, the surround-
ing circumstances and the action for fraudulent concealment of community prop-
erty show that the wife did not renounce her share for a donative reason. She
intended to discharge her legal obligation of supporting her incompetent daughter
after the husband's demise.
It seems unlikely that the California legislature intended to impose a gift tax
where the transferor confers on the transferee benefits normally associated with
support, such as the care and maintenance of a minor or an incompetent. This
is especially true in view of the interpretation given by the federal courts to
an identical statutory mandate.43
If the California courts follow the above interpretation of sections 15105 and
15106 of the California Revenue and Taxation Code, a transfer made in fulfill-
ment of a parent's legal obligation of support will not be subject to a state gift
tax. This means that neither a state inheritance nor gift tax will be imposed on
testamentary transfers for money's value.
Income Tax
If a transfer for money's worth is exempt from an inheritance and a gift tax,
will there be a federal or state income tax liability? The California Revenue and
Taxation Code, 44 and the Federal Internal Revenue Code of 1954,45 provide that
if, pursuant to the terms of the trust, income is used to discharge a settloer's legal
obligation of support, the income so used is taxable to the settlor. Thus, an income
tax lies where a trust is established to fulfill a parent's legal obligation of support-
ing his minor or incompetent child.
Impact of the Vai Decision
If the California courts follow the federal courts in holding that a transfer
in discharge of a legal obligation of support is not a taxable gift, then the decision
of Estate of Vai4 6 will affect the amount of revenue coming into the state treasury.
It would exempt transfers in discharge of a parent's duty to support his child
from any gift or inheritance tax. The only tax that could be imposed would be
an income tax on the amount of income used each year to discharge the legal
duty of reasonable support. The resulting loss of revenue to the state is seen by
the situation in the Vai case. The daughter will receive 30,000 dollars per year
for her support; the state income tax on this sum is only 800 dollars.47 At the
time of her father's death, she was thirty-one years old. Estimating her life
43 INT. REv. CODE 1954, § 677; Treas. Reg. § 1.662(a)-4 (1955).
44 CAL. Prav. & TAx. CODE §§ 17001(15), 17791.
45 CAL. REv. & TAx. CODE §§ 17253, 17255; and Treas. Reg. 39.12(x)-(1)(b)(1)
allow a limited deduction for medical expenses of the taxpayer's children to the amount
exceeding 5% of the adjusted gross income for the taxable year; but not to exceed $1,250
per year.
4665 A.C. 139, 52 Cal. Rptr. 705, 417 P.2d 161 (1966).
47 CAL. REv. & TAx. CoDE § 19200.
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expectancy to be seventy, the state will receive only 31,200 dollars. However,
an inheritance tax on 515,000 dollars is over 50,000 dollars. 48 Thus, there will
be a sizeable reduction in the amount of revenue coming into the state treasury.
The impact of the Vat decision will depend on the extent to which estate
planners can utilize it for tax saving purposes. Suppose X contracts with Y, for
Y to perform services for X, in consideration for which X agrees to ,transfer by
will an agreed sum of money to Y. So long as the reasonable value of the services
rendered is equal to the amount provided in X's will for Y, there will be neither
an inheritance tax nor a gift tax due. However, such a transfer will be looked
upon as money earned by Y, and the entire sum transferred will be taxable as in-
come. The income tax would be greater than either the inheritance or the gift tax.
Thus, it appears that the income tax consequences would make such a device um-
practical.
The impact of the coflrt's, holding in Estate of Vai49 is seemingly limited to
transfers wluch fulfill a taxpayer's legal obligation of reasonable support. As to
mentally incompetent adults, the legal obligation is imposed primarily upon the
incompetent's spouse.50 However, in the absence of a spouse, the obligation falls
upon the incompetent's father, then his mother, and finally his children.51 As to
minors, the father is primarily responsible for their support; 52 and the mother
becomes liable upon her husband's death or his inability to fulfill the obligation
without her financial assistance.5 3 A testamentary transfer by either of the persons
named above, in fulfillment of their legal obligation of reasonable support, should
mcur neither an inheritance nor a gift tax. Although this is very likely to result
in a decrease of revenue to the state treasury, it is a lust result since the state is
saved the expense of providing for the maintenance and support of those unable
to provide for their owrr care.
Under the holding of Estate of Vat, a testamentary transfer for full value is
exempt from the state inheritance tax. If the California courts accept the logical
view that the fulfillment of a legal obligation of reasonable support is adequate
and full consideration, a testamentary support trust will be exempt from the state
inheritance and gift taxes. It is urged that the California courts follow the lead
of the federal courts and recognize such transfers as being nontaxable.
Bernard P Simons*
4 8 CAL., RLv. & TAX. CODE §§ 13307, 1,3404.
4965 A.C. 139, 52 Cal. Rptr. 705, 417 P.2d 161 (1966).
5o CAL. WELFAiE & INST'NS CODE § 5077.
51 CAL. WEAm & INsT'Ns CoDE § 5077.
5 2 CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 196, 205.
53 CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 196, 205.
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